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Abstract. We introduce a route choice model that incorporates
the notion of choice aversion in transportation networks. Formally,
we propose a recursive logit model which incorporates a penalty
term that accounts for the dimension of the choice set at each node
of the network. We make three contributions. First, we show that
our model overcomes the correlation problem between routes, a
common pitfall of traditional logit models. In particular, our ap-
proach can be seen as an alternative to the class of models known
as Path Size Logit (PSL). Second, we show how our model can
generate violations of regularity in the path choice probabilities.
In particular, we show that removing edges in the network can de-
crease the probability of some existing paths. Finally, we show that
under the presence of choice aversion, adding edges to the network
can increase the total cost of the system. In other words, a type
of Braess’s paradox can emerge even in the case of uncongested
networks. We show that these phenomena can be characterized in
terms of a parameter that measures users’ degree of choice aver-
sion.
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21. Introduction
Discrete choice models have been used extensively to understand the
behavior of participants (who we will refer to as users) in transportation
networks (McFadden (1978, 1981) and Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)).
In this context, users choose a path that minimizes their total cost
of traveling. A prominent model that has arisen from this literature
is the Multinomial Logit Model (MNL), whose main advantage is its
tractability and closed-form choice probabilities.
Despite its popularity, the MNL presents some drawbacks when ap-
plied to the case of transportation networks. In particular, the MNL
can predict unrealistic choice probabilities for paths sharing common
edges in the network. The root of this problem traces back to the In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom that is required to
derive the MNL.
To explain the severity of the overlapping paths problem, consider
the simple transportation network displayed in Figure 1.
s i1 t
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Figure 1. Paths (a1, a3) and (a1, a4) share edge a1.
In this network we have three paths: (a1, a3), (a1, a4), and (a2).
Assume the cost of each path is 1. At the edge level, assume that the
cost of edge a1 is 1 − , the cost of edges a3 and a4 is , and, finally,
the cost of edge a2 is 1.
For the setting described above, the MNL will predict that each path
is chosen with probability 1/3. However, these choice probabilities
are unrealistic when paths lack distinctiveness or independence from
another. In particular, an assignment in which path (a2) is chosen
3with probability 1/2 and paths (a1, a3) and (a1, a4) are chosen with
probability 1/4 is more sensible. More explicitly, this latter solution
takes into account the fact that paths (a1, a3) and (a1, a4) share the
common edge a1 and in terms of total cost they are equivalent to each
other as well as the cost of path (a2). The reason why the MNL model
cannot accommodate situations where the path costs are correlated is
because the MNL relies on the property of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA). As the discussion above shows, the IIA property is
hardly satisfied even in simple transportation networks.1
Recognizing this pitfall, the transportation literature has proposed
several corrections to the MNL. This class of extensions is known as
Path Size Logit (PSL). The idea of this class of models is to correct the
problem of overlapping paths by adding an extra correlation-penalizing
term to path costs. Thus, when the choice probabilities are generated
through a standard MNL, the correction will account for the degree of
overlapping between different paths.
While its usefulness in correction is clear, the PSL class has two prob-
lems. First, the type of correction employed by the different models do
not have a theoretical justification in terms of users’ behavior. In par-
ticular, the parameters describing the corrections do not have a direct
interpretation from an economic viewpoint. Second, it is not clear how
PSL models can be used to carry out welfare analysis in transportation
networks. For instance, it is hard to interpret and predict the changes
on welfare when edges are added to, or severed from, the network.
In this paper, we propose the use of a recursive logit model which
incorporates the idea of choice aversion (choice overload) in users’ be-
havior. In doing so we follow Lorca and Melo (2020) who adapt the
approach of Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) to the context of directed
graphs. Simply put, the choice aversion hypothesis states that an in-
crease in the number of alternatives to choose from may lead to adverse
1An in-depth discussion on path correlation and IIA can be found in McFadden
(1974), which introduces the canonical red bus/blue bus problem.
4consequences, such as lesser motivation to actually choose or lower sat-
isfaction ex post (cf. Sheena and Lepper (2000) and Scheibehenne et al.
(2010)).
Formally, we consider a transportation network with source node s
and designated sink node t. In this setting, we model users’ behavior as
a sequential choice process: when assessing an edge a at some node i 6=
t, users evaluate both the flow cost and the appropriate continuation
value associated to such an edge. Following Fudenberg and Strzalecki,
we introduce a term that penalizes the size of each choice set that stems
subsequently from every current edge under scrutiny. In particular,
when considering an edge a at node i, users will penalize the number
of outgoing edges at i. In other words, when facing a set of alternatives
in order to depart from a specific node, users incorporate the size of the
ensuing choice set when they appraise the continuation value of each
outgoing edge. Formally, at each node i 6= t, we consider the penalty
κ log |A+i |, where |A+i | is the cardinality of the set of outgoing edges at
node i and κ ≥ 0 is a parameter that captures users’ choice aversion
degree.
We make three contributions. First, we show that a recursive logit
with choice aversion can overcome the problem of overlapping in trans-
portation networks. In particular, the parameter κ plays a critical role
in the form of the correction. We show that our model performs as well
as the recent Adjusted PSL model introduced by Duncan et al. (2020).
However, our correction has two main advantages. First, it is a simple
correction based on users’ optimal behavior. Second, the parameter κ
has a clear interpretation in terms of users’ attitude with respect to
size of choice sets.
In our second contribution, we show how our model captures viola-
tions of regularity (Luce and Suppes (1965)). Formally, we show that
removing an edge in a particular node can decrease the choice proba-
bilities of some paths in the network. To grasp how this result works,
we note that removing an edge a at node i is equivalent to removing
the set of all paths in which a is a member. When removing an edge
5in the traditional MNL (i.e., the choice aversion model with κ = 0),
the choice probability of the remaining paths increase proportionally.
However, in our model, removing the edge a not only reduces the set of
available paths (passing through node i) but also decreases the choice
aversion costs associated to these paths. This latter reduction makes
the set of paths passing through node i comparatively less expensive
than those not using node i. As a consequence, the path choice prob-
abilities of paths passing through node i increase due to the reduction
in the set of available paths and the choice aversion cost reduction.
We formalize the failure of regularity in terms of a precise relation-
ship between the parameter κ and the choice probabilities of paths
using the node where the edge is removed. As far as we know, this
result is new to the literature on recursive models in transportation
networks.
In our final contribution, we study how our model can capture a
Braess’s-like paradox. In particular, we show how adding edges to the
network can decrease users’ welfare. Similarly to regularity failure, we
also characterize this result in terms of the degree of choice aversion κ.
Unlike existing models and extensions, the behavioral foundation of the
choice aversion model and its formulation allows for a tradeoff between
instantaneous route costs and choice aversion penalization such that
decreases in welfare can be observed even in the absence of congestion.
To our knowledge, this is also a novel result that can shed light on the
design of transportation networks and its effects on welfare.
1.1. Related Literature. Recursive logit models have been studied
by Baillon and Cominetti (2008), Fosgerau et al. (2013), and Mai et al.
(2015) among others.2 Our paper differs from theirs in at least two di-
mensions. First, we extend their recursive approach to incorporate the
notion of choice aversion. Second, we show how our model can handle
the problem of path overlapping, violations of regularity, and Braess’s-
like paradoxes. With respect to PSL models, the existing literature is
2For an up to date survey on recursive models in traffic networks we refer the
reader to Zimmermann and Frejinger (2020).
6extensive (Ben-Akiva and Bierlarie (1999) and Frejinger and Bierlarie
(2007)), and Duncan et al. (2020) present an up-to-date discussion of
the PSL approach. In addition, they propose an alternative correction
denominated as the Adaptive Path Size Logit (APSL) model. Our re-
sults differ from theirs in the type of the behavioral foundation we use.
From a behavioral standpoint, a similar approach to this paper is
found in Fosgerau and Jiang (2019) and Jiang et al. (2020), who incor-
porate a rational inattention model into the context of transportation
networks. While choice aversion and rational inattention are inter-
connected in terms of information processing, we model a particular
variant of costly decision-making in the form of aversion to increasing
choices, rather than mutual information through observing a signal.
This modeling choice allows us to generate clear path choice predic-
tions, violations of regularity, and Braess’s-like paradox phenomena.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the recursive logit model with choice aversion. Section 3 explores the
use of choice aversion in the path choice model and in comparison to
existing Path Size Logit (PSL) models. Section 4 discusses the failure
of regularity. Section 5 discusses a type of Braess’s paradox observed
as a consequence of choice aversion. Section 6 concludes.
2. Recursive logit in Directed Networks
In this section we propose a recursive discrete choice model in di-
rected networks. Formally, we model a set of users as solving a dynamic
programming problem over a directed, acyclic graph. In a noticeable
departure from previous literature, we adapt the choice aversion formu-
lation of Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) into the context of directed
graphs, and then we analyze the consequences on equilibria and wel-
fare.3
3Througout the text we use the term choice overload to refer to choice aversion.
72.1. Directed graphs. Consider a directed acyclic graph G = (N,A)
where N is the set of nodes and A the set of edges, respectively. We
denote the set of ingoing edges to node i by A−i , and the set of outgoing
edges from node i by A+i . We refer accordingly to the out-degree of node
i as |A+i |.
Without loss of generality, we assume that G has a single source-sink
pair, where s and t stand for the source (origin) and sink (destination)
nodes, respectively. Let ja be the node j that has been reached through
edge a. We therefore define a path as a sequence of edges (a1, . . . aK)
with ak+1 ∈ A+jak for all k < K.
The set of paths connecting nodes s and t is denoted by R. The set
of paths connecting nodes s and i 6= t is denoted by Rsi. Similarly, the
set of all paths connecting nodes i 6= s and t is denoted as Rit. Let Ri
denote the set of paths passing through i. Finally, let Rci denote the
set of paths not passing through node i.
A deterministic cost component ca > 0 is associated with each edge
a ∈ A+i for all i 6= t. Path costs are assumed to be edge additive,
that is, for a path r = (a1, . . . aK) ∈ R its associated cost is given by∑K
k=1 cak .
We assume that at node s there is a unitary mass of network users
who must choose a path from the set R. For the sake of exposition,
the mass of users is summarized by the canonical vector es, which has
a 1 in the position of node s and zero elsewhere. The dimension of es
is |N | − 1.
2.2. Choice aversion. We now develop a recursive logit choice model
over G that incorporates choice overload by means of an specific kind
of penalty on ensuing choice sets stemming from each edge appraisal.
In particular, we adapt the choice aversion approach from Fudenberg
and Strzalecki (2015) into the environment described by G as follows:
for each a ∈ A+i we associate a collection of i.i.d. random variables
{a}a∈A+i such that the recursive cost associated to edge a is defined
8as:
(1) Va = ca + E
(
min
a′∈A+ja
{Va′ + a′ + κ log |A+ja |}
)
for all a ∈ A+i ,
where ca denotes the instantaneous cost associated to edge a and the
term
E
(
min
a′∈A+ja
{Va′ + a′ + κ log |A+ja |}
)
= E
(
min
a′∈A+ja
{Va′ + a′}
)
+κ log |A+ja |
is the adjusted continuation value associated to the selection of a.
Notice that the latter term includes the factor κ log |A+ja|, which is a
penalty term that captures the size of the set A+ja , where κ ≥ 0.4
Following Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015), we impose the following
assumption on the random variables {a}a∈A+i .
Assumption 1 (Logit choice rule). At each node i 6= t the collection
of random variables {a}a∈A+i follows a Gumbel distribution with scale
parameter µ = 1.
Under this assumption, Eq. (1) can be expressed as:
(2) Va = ca − log
(∑
a′∈A+ja
e−Va′
)
+ κ log |A+ja |,
where − log
(∑
a′∈A+ja
e−Va′
)
+κ log |A+ja| provides a closed-form expres-
sion for the adjusted continuation value.5
Let us define ϕja(V ) , − log
(∑
a′∈A+ja
e−Va′
)
for all ja 6= t. Accord-
ingly Eq. (2) can be rewritten as:
(3) Va = ca + ϕja(V ) + κ log |A+ja|.
The previous expression deserves some remarks. First, the continu-
ation value in Eq. (3) captures the complexity of the choice sets A+ja ,
4Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) study a recursive logit model in the context of
intertemporal choice. In doing so, they consider a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). We
focus on a digraph G without discounting.
5See Train (2009), Chapter 3.
9as measured by κ log |A+ja|, with κ ≥ 0. Intuitively, κ log |A+ja | penal-
izes the size of the choice sets at different nodes, where the parameter
κ ≥ 0 measures decision makers’ attitudes towards the size of A+ja . In
particular, Va is an increasing function of κ and log |A+ja |.
Second, when κ = 0, Eq. (3) boils down to a traditional recursive
logit model in which users are choice-loving in the sense that they al-
ways prefer to add additional items into the menu, as in the “preference
for flexibility” of Kreps (1979). To see this, note that when κ = 0 the
function ϕja(V ) is decreasing in |A+ja|. As a consequence, the recursive
cost Va is decreasing in the size of A
+
ja
. This latter feature implies that
traditional recursive logit models in transportation networks (e.g. Bail-
lon and Cominetti, 2008 and Fosgerau et al., 2013) can be associated
with an intrinsic taste for plentiful options.
On the other hand, the case of κ ∈ (0, 1) from an economic stand-
point may be interpreted as a situation where the users prefer to include
additional alternatives to the menu, provided the new options are not
too much worse than the current average. Finally, the case κ ≥ 1
is interpreted as a situation in which the users only wish to add al-
ternatives that are perceived to be sufficiently better. In particular,
the case κ = 1 captures a situation where the users want to remove
choices that are worse than the average: they worry about choosing
such additional alternatives by accident given appraisal costs—such as
Ortoleva (2013)’s thinking aversion—that may offset the benefits of the
corresponding random draw.
In sum, the parameter κ encapsulates the scale of penalties on the set
of ensuing actions arising from each nonterminal node, which unlocks
keen consequences on users’ attitudes towards marginally increasing the
set of edges. Following Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015), we identify κ
as the users’ choice aversion parameter. We point out that all of our
analysis extends to the case of node-specific choice aversion parameters
κi for all i ∈ N . We stress the relevance of allowing for heterogeneous
{κi}i∈N in §3-5.
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2.3. Flow allocation. Each user is looking for an optimal path con-
necting s and t. Now, when they reach node i 6= t, they observe the
realization of the random costs Va+a for all a ∈ A+i , and consequently
choose the alternative a ∈ A+i with the lowest cost.
This process is repeated at each subsequent node giving rise to a
recursive discrete choice model, where the expected flow entering node
i 6= t splits among the alternatives a ∈ A+i according to the choice
probability:
(4) P(a|A+i ) = P
(
Va + a ≤ Va′ + a′ ∀a′ 6= a ∈ A+i
) ∀i 6= t.
Due to Assumption 1, Eq. (4) can be rewritten as:
(5) P(a|A+i ) =
e−(ca+ϕja (V )+κ log |A
+
ja
|)∑
a′∈A+i e
−(ca′+ϕja′ (V )+κ log |A
+
ja′
|) ∀i 6= t.
As κ increases, the edge choice probability P(a|A+i ) is increasingly
penalized by the choice set |A+ja|, reflecting the effect of choice overload
onto a user’s edge cost from nodes with large choice sets. This is a
fundamental difference with the traditional recursive logit model, which
assumes κ = 0 as we mentioned before.
Mathematically, the recursive process just described induces a Markov
chain over the graph G, where the transition probabilities are given by
Eq. (5). Let xi be the expected flow entering at node i towards sink
node t. Then the flow received by edge a is given by:
(6) fa = xiP(a|A+i ) ∀a ∈ A+i ,
with f = (fa)a∈A denoting the expected flow vector.
In addition, let Pˆ = (Pij)i,j 6=t denote the restriction to the set of
nodes N \ {t}. Then the expected demand vector x = (xi)i 6=t may be
expressed as x = es + PˆTx which generates the following stochastic
conservation flow equations
(7) xi =
∑
a∈A−i
fa for all i 6= t.
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A flow vector f satisfying (7) is called feasible. It is worth mentioning
that the there exists a unique flow vector x∗ satisfying the flow con-
straints (7). In fact, using Baillon and Cominetti (2008, Lemma 1)
it is possible to show that [I − P>]−1 is well defined. Then x∗ is the
unique vector that satisfies x∗ = [I − P>]−1es and fa = x∗iP(a|A+i ) for
all a ∈ A+i , i 6= t.
2.4. Path choice and choice aversion. In this section we note that
the solution of our recursive choice model can be equivalently written
in terms of path choice probabilities. In doing so, assume that for each
path r ∈ R the cost associated to it is a random variable defined as
(8) C˜r = Cr + r ∀r ∈ R,
where Cr =
∑
a∈r(ca + κ log |A+ja|) =
∑
a∈r ca + κ
∑
a∈r log |A+ja | and
{r}r∈R is a collection of absolutely continuous random variables satis-
fying Assumption 1.
Under these conditions, the probability of choosing path r is defined
as:
(9) Pr , P
(
r = arg min
r′∈R
{Cr′ + r′}
)
∀r ∈ R.
Equations (8) and (9) jointly define a path choice model over R,
where we again refer to the Gumbel assumption to obtain:
(10) Pr =
e−Cr∑
r′∈R e
−Cr′
∀r ∈ R.
However, it is well known that the path choice probability Pr can
be decomposed in terms of the edge probabilities (e.g., Fosgerau et al.
(2013) and Lorca and Melo (2020)). Formally, we have that for each
path r = (a1, . . . , aK) ∈ R with K ≥ 2, the following equality holds
(11) Pr =
K∏
k=1
P(ak|A+s )P(ak+1|A+jak ).
The previous characterization will play a key role in next sections.
Intuitively, Eq. (11) establishes that the Pr can be decomposed in
terms of the recursive choice probabilities. This equivalence allows us
12
to highlight the role and effect of the terms κ log |A+ja| in the path choice
probabilities Pr.
2.4.1. Heterogenous κ. As we mentioned earlier, holding κ fixed across
nodes is not a necessity in our setup. In fact, to model user behavior
accurately, it is sensible to reevaluate the assumption of a homoge-
neous choice aversion parameter when considering a variety of trans-
portation network contexts. In many cases, a user might be more
sensitive to choice overload at one particular node relative to another.
For instance, in a context where nodes might represent locations along
routes where a user must choose which direction to turn, nodes may
differ across characteristics like visibility, intersection type, or lane
width.6 If we allow the choice aversion parameter to be node-specific,
then we update Eq. (8) such that Cr =
∑
a∈r(ca + κja log |A+ja|) =∑
a∈r ca +
∑
a∈r κja log |A+ja|. As a result, the path choice probability
Pr for each path r ∈ R takes the form
(12) Pr =
e−cr−ρr∑
r′∈R e
−cr′−ρr′
for all r ∈ R,
where cr =
∑
a∈r ca and ρr ,
∑
a∈r κja log |A+ja|. From here, we note
that the path choice probability above simplifies to Eq. (10) in the
special case of κja = κ ≥ 0 for all ja 6= t.
3. Choice aversion and the IIA property
In the context of path choice models, it is well known that the tra-
ditional MNL model is restricted by the IIA property, which does not
hold in the context of route choice due to the overlapping paths prob-
lem. The main implication of overlapping paths is that the traditional
6It is important that we leave out traffic congestion as a characteristic to justify
heterogeneous choice aversion parameters across nodes. In this paper we are only
studying uncongested networks with fixed costs along each edge. However, it is
certainly sensible that heavily congested intersections induce greater anxiety for
many real-world drivers, and choice overload may indeed influence driver behavior
to make routing choices that steer clear from these intersections. We note this in
Section 6.
13
MNL produces unrealistic path choice probabilities (Ben-Akiva and
Ramming and Ben-Akiva and Bierlarie (1999)).
In order to solve this problem, the route choice literature has pro-
posed the Path Size Logit (PSL) approach. In simple terms, PSL mod-
els extend the MNL by adding a correction term to path costs which
account for the degree of overlapping among paths. For instance, Ben-
Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Ben-Akiva and Bierlarie, 1999, Frejinger and
Bierlarie, 2007, and recently Duncan et al. (2020) propose different cor-
rections to the MNL in order to solve the overlapping problem. From
a behavioral point of view, PSL models try to correct the fact that the
IIA property should be relaxed in contexts where paths are not distinct
or independent.
In this section, we show how choice aversion can be seen as a nat-
ural mechanism that overcomes the problem of overlapping paths in
transportation networks.
Assuming κi = κ for all i 6= s, t, let us rewrite Eq. (11) in §2 as
follows:
(13) Pr =
e−cr−κγr∑
r′∈R e
−cr′−κγr′
for all r ∈ R,
where cr =
∑
a∈r ca, γr ,
∑
a∈r log |A+ja|, and κ ≥ 0 is the (homoge-
neous) choice aversion parameter.7
It is easy to see that for κ > 0, the term κγr can be seen as a penalty
term that accounts for the size of the choice set at each of the nodes
accessed along path r.8
Formally, the term κγr accounts for the degree of overlapping among
different paths. In particular, the presence of κγr accounts for the fact
that, in our recursive model, the IIA property does not hold.
7Note that equation (12) simplifies to (13) when the choice aversion parameters
are fixed across nodes. In this case, ρr = κγr.
8Note that paths passing through a common node i would share the penalty
κ log |A+i |.
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To see how our model works, consider two paths r and r′ with asso-
ciated probabilities Pr and Pr′ respectively. Computing the probability
ratio between r and r′ we get:
(14)
Pr
Pr′
=
e−cr
e−cr′
× e
−κγr
e−κγr′
Note that expression (14) shows that the ratio PrPr′
depends on the
ratio between the costs associated to paths r and r′ times the ratio
between κγr and κγr′ . This latter term incorporates information about
r and r′ regarding choice sets at each node crossed by these paths. This
information is captured by the terms κγr and κγr′ .
From (14) it follows that adding or deleting links in a particular
node contained (crossed) in r (or r′) will affect the ratio e
−κγr
e−κγr′
, and as
a consequence PrPr′
will be modified. In other words, PrPr′
depends not
only on r and r′, but also on other paths passing by the same nodes
as r and r′ do. Note that when κ = 0, then PrPr′ =
e−cr
e−cr′
and we recover
the IIA property in the MNL model. Similarly, if paths r and r′ pass
through the same nodes, we get κγr = κγr′ , so that
Pr
Pr′
= e
−cr
e−cr′
. Thus,
the factor e
−κγr
e−κγr′
captures the degree of overlapping between different
paths.
In order to see how our model overcomes the overlapping problem,
we study a concrete case. Let us reintroduce the network in Figure 2
where the set of paths is given by R = {r1, r2, r3} with r1 = (a1, a3),
r2 = (a1, a4), and r3 = (a2). For this example, we assume ca1 = 1.9,
ca3 = ca4 = 0.1, and ca2 = 2.
s i1 t
a1
a2
a3
a4
Figure 2. Logit path choice.
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As we have previously discussed for this network structure, paths
r1 and r2 overlap, sharing the common edge a1. Under this parame-
terization of instantaneous cost, coupled with κ = 0, it follows that
cr1 = cr2 = cr3 = 2, and, consequently, the logit choice rule (13) assigns
one third of flow to each path. In other words, with κ = 0, we get
Pr1 = Pr2 = Pr3 = 13 . However, since paths r1 and r2 are identical, the
assignment Pr1 = Pr2 = 14 and Pr3 =
1
2
is a more appropriate allocation.
However, as κ → 1, the logit model with choice aversion predicts a
flow allocation approaching
(
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
2
)
. To understand this, we look at
the probability ratio between paths r1, r2, and r3:
(15)
Pr1
Pr2
= 1 and
Pr1
Pr3
=
Pr2
Pr3
= e−κ log 2.
From the previous expression, it follows that the value of κ will affect
the ratios
Pr1
Pr3
and
Pr2
Pr3
, but not
Pr1
Pr2
. In particular, Eq. (15) shows that
the ratios
Pr1
Pr3
and
Pr2
Pr3
are decreasing in κ. In other words, as the degree
of choice aversion increases, the probabilities Pr1 and Pr2 decrease while
the probability associated to r3 increases.
Figure 3 shows how the route choice probabilities in Figure 2 respond
to κ ∈ [0, 2.5] under choice aversion.
Now assume that a new edge aˆ is added at node i1. This implies
that the new set of paths is Rˆ = R∪{aˆ}. In terms of Eq. (15), adding
aˆ implies that:
Pr1
Pr2
= 1 and
Pr1
Pr3
=
Pr2
Pr3
= e−κ log 3.
This latter expression makes explicit the fact that changes in R will
change the probability ratio between different paths.
3.1. Choice aversion compared to PSL models. What the anal-
ysis just laid out shows—which applies to the general case of directed
networks—is that from the vantage point of path selection, choice aver-
sion is a robust way to derive path choice probabilities, even in the case
of overlapping of different routes. This robustness feature makes our
16
Figure 3. Route Choice Probabilities for Figure 2.
approach similar to the class of PSL models, which is widely used in
applied work (e.g. Duncan et al. (2020)).
In this section we compare how our approach compares with some of
the best well-known PSL models.9 Figure 4 displays a network topology
originally featured in Fosgerau et al. (2013). We test the performance
of the choice aversion model on this network in calculating path choice
probabilities. We assume that this is a directed acyclical graph, where
the set of paths is given by R = {r1, r2, r3, r4} with r1 = (12, 23, 35),
r2 = (12, 23, 34, 45), r3 = (12, 24, 45), and r4 = (15).
This graph represents a more complex uncongested network topology
where the cost of all routes ri ∈ R are equal. Thus, the only difference
in routes 1 through 4 are the choice sets at each node along the path.
The MNL model (equivalent to κ = 0 in the choice aversion model)
predicts equal path choice probabilities, i.e., Pri = 14 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Figure 5(A) shows choice probabilities as κ increases from 0 to 10. As
the choice aversion penalization grows larger, Pr4 approaches 1, since
it is the only route with no choice set for the user after node 1. On
9For ease of exposition we provide the details of the PSL models discussed in
this section in Appendix A.
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Figure 4. Complex network example from Fosgerau
et al. (2013).
the other hand, while r1 and r2 have equivalent choice aversion terms,
r3 has the advantage of lacking an additional downstream choice in
comparison, allowing Pr3 > Pr1 = Pr2 for κ > 0 until the choice aversion
parameter grows so large that the respective route choice probabilities
converge and approach zero.
(A) Choice aversion model (B) Adaptive PSL model
Figure 5. Route choice probabilities for complex net-
work example.
The prediction in Figure 5(A) differs from route choice probabilities
generated by many PSL models and extensions, including the models
discussed in Fosgerau et al. (2013) and the Adaptive PSL model pro-
posed by Duncan et al. (2020). This latter model is shown in Figure
5(B). For these models, path correction cost is based on correlation of
routes through link-path incidence rather than a penalization for size
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of choice sets along the path. As a result, we see that for most PSL
models, including the Adaptive PSL model, Pr1 = Pr3 for all values of
β, not Pr1 = Pr2 as in the choice aversion model.
The behavioral nature of the choice aversion model allows for a dif-
ferent type of correction than most PSL models. The choice aversion
model and other PSL models work in a similar way in the sense of over-
coming the overlapping path problem. However, the choice aversion
model has a simple and clear behavioral interpretation. This feature
sets the choice aversion model apart from other PSL models both in
terms of interpretation and performance.
3.2. RNL and IIA. In this section we compare our approach with the
Recursive Nested logit (RNL) model (Mai et al. (2015)). Similar to our
approach, the RNL does not impose the IIA property. In particular,
in order to allow for correlation among paths, Mai et al. (2015) extend
the recursive logit model by allowing the scale parameter µa of the
Gumbel-distributed random variables {a}a∈A to be link-specific (in
contrast with our Assumption 1). Under this more general assumption,
Mai et al. (2015) show that the RNL allows for situations where the
IIA property does not hold. They show that the RNL generates more
realistic path choice probabilities.
Formally, the main difference between the recursive logit and the
RNL model is that the continuation values ϕˆ are defined as
(16) ϕˆjb(V ) = E
(
min
a∈A+jb
{ca + ϕˆja + µjba}
)
∀b ∈ A.
From (16) it is easy to see that the RNL allows for heterogeneous
scale parameters µjb that are edge-specific. This modification allows
for correlation between alternatives and payoffs. They show that the
IIA property holds for paths within the same nest but not for paths
in different nests. More importantly, Mai et al. (2015) show that the
RNL can be seen as a solution to the overlapping paths problem.
Note that given the structure of the NRL, we can extend our choice
aversion model to this context. To see this note that Eq. (16) can be
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rewritten as:
ϕˆjb(V ) = E
(
min
a∈A+jb
{ca + ϕˆja + µjba}
)
+ κ log |A+jb| ∀b ∈ A.
Thus choice aversion can be combined with the RNL approach in a
simple way.
However, there are at least two important differences between the
choice aversion and the RNL models. First, in our approach, the be-
havioral mechanism that allows for situations where IIA does not hold
is the idea of choice aversion (or choice overload). Second, as we shall
see in §4, our model allows for the failure of the regularity property in
the path choice probabilities. Thereby, our approach can be seen as
more flexible than the RNL model.
4. Choice aversion and the failure of regularity
In the standard MNL (κ = 0), adding an additional alternative to
the choice set cannot increase the probability that an existing action
is selected (and vice versa). This is known as the regularity property
in discrete choice models (Luce and Suppes (1965, Def. 26)).
In this section, we show that there exists a critical value of κ, which
allows us to understand how varying the network G can generate viola-
tions of regularity. In order to gain some intuition, we discuss a simple
network that allows us to show how regularity may break down. In
particular, we study one of the nested network structures considered in
Mai et al. (2015). Figure 6 replicates their Figure 3. This network has
four nodes {A, B, C, D} and eight links between the source node A
and sink node D. There are six possible paths from o to d: (o, a, a1, d),
(o, a, a2, d), (o, a, a3, d), (o, b, b1, d), (o, b, b2, d), and (o, b, b3, d). We de-
note these path by r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, and r6, respectively.
Tables 1 and 2 display route choice probabilities when links a1, a2,
b1, and b2 are removed from the nested network in Figure 6. Table 1
shows the results when choice parameters are homogeneous (i.e., κB =
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Figure 6. Nested network structure from Mai et al.
(2015).
κC = κ = 1), and Table 2 shows the results when κC = 2, all else held
equal.
Route Homogen. Route Choice Probabilities when Edge is Removed
a1 a2 b1 b2
r1=(o, a, a1, d) 0.4485 - 0.6174 (38%) 0.4185 (-7%) 0.4429 (-1%)
r2=(o, a, a2, d) 0.1650 0.3726 (126%) - 0.1539 (-7%) 0.1629 (-1%)
r3=(o, a, a3, d) 0.0607 0.1371 (126%) 0.0836 (38%) 0.0566 (-7%) 0.0599 (-1%)
r4=(o, b, b1, d) 0.0607 0.0914 (51%) 0.0557 (-8%) - 0.0899 (48%)
r5=(o, b, b2, d) 0.1001 0.1506 (51%) 0.0918 (-8%) 0.1401 (40%) -
r6=(o, b, b3, d) 0.1650 0.2484 (51%) 0.1514 (-8%) 0.2309 (40%) 0.2444 (48%)
Table 1. Route Choice Probabilities for Figure 6 with
κB = κC = κ = 1 and Edges Removed.
Route κC = 2 Route Choice Probabilities when Edge is Removed
a1 a2 b1 b2
r1=(o, a, a1, d) 0.5730 - 0.7712 (35%) 0.5138 (-10%) 0.5317 (-7%)
r2=(o, a, a2, d) 0.2108 0.5535 (163%) - 0.1890 (-10%) 0.1956 (-7%)
r3=(o, a, a3, d) 0.0775 0.2036 (163%) 0.1044 (35%) 0.0695 (-10%) 0.0720 (-7%)
r4=(o, b, b1, d) 0.0258 0.0453 (75%) 0.0232 (-10%) - 0.0540 (109%)
r5=(o, b, b2, d) 0.0426 0.0746 (75%) 0.0382 (-10%) 0.0860 (102%) -
r6=(o, b, b3, d) 0.0703 0.1230 (75%) 0.0630 (-10%) 0.1417 (102%) 0.1467 (109%)
Table 2. Route Choice Probabilities for Figure 6 with
κC = 2 and Edges Removed.
From Table 1, we note that when link a1 is removed, the choice
probabilities of remaining paths {r2, . . . , r6} increase. Note that the
probabilities of paths r2 and r3 increase in the same proportion (126%).
Similarly, the probabilities of paths r4, r5, and r6 also increase in the
same proportion (51%). Each increase is even more pronounced in
Table 2 where κC = 2. However, in both tables, the increase is not
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proportional across paths crossing different nodes. This feature comes
from the IIA property, which holds within nodes (nests) but not across
them.
Now, consider the case of removing edge a2. In Table 1, the prob-
abilities of paths r1 and r3 increase proportionally (38%). However,
the probability of paths r4, r5, and r6 actually decrease. This coun-
terintuitive result is a consequence of the fact that removing edge a2
not only reduces the number of available paths but also decreases the
cost associated to paths r1 and r3. In other words, this effect can be
decomposed into two parts. First, the IIA property implies that the
probabilities of r1, r3, r4, r5, and r6 will increase upon removing edge
a2. The second force behind this counterintuitive result is that remov-
ing edge a2 reduces the choice set when taking paths r1 and r3. For
a choice averse user, this latter effect implies that κ log 3 reduces to
κ log 2, which makes paths r1 and r3 relatively more attractive than r4,
r5, and r6, such that the probabilities of r4, r5, and r6 decrease. When
this second effect dominates, we will observe the failure of regularity
associated with removing edge a2.
It may be tempting to think that the effect in path choices described
above may be driven by the assumption that κ is homogeneous. How-
ever, Table 2 shows that a similar pattern occurs when we consider
κB = 1 and κC = 2. In this case, the failure of regularity is even
more pronounced through relatively larger changes to remaining path
probabilities.
We formalize the previous intuition in Proposition 1 below. In doing
so, recall that Ri is the set of paths passing through node i. Similarly
the set of paths not passing through node i is defined asRci . In addition,
define Ria as the set of paths passing through node i after removing
edge a at node i. We note that Ria ⊆ Ri. Note that before and after
removing and edge the set Rci is the same.
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We remark that after the edge a at node i is removed, the cost of
paths in Ria can be expressed as
C¯r = Cr + ∆i ∀r ∈ Ria
where ∆i , κi
(
log |A+i − 1| − log |A+i |
)
. Note that ∆i is constant
across all paths inRia. Let P(Ri) =
∑
r∈Ri Pr and P(Ria) =
∑
r∈Ria Pr.
Proposition 1. The probability of choosing a path r ∈ Rci decreases
after removing an edge a ∈ A+i if
(17) κi >
log
(
P(Ri)
P(Ria)
)
log
(
|A+i |
|A+i |−1
) .
Proof. Without loss of generality, fix a path r ∈ Rci . Let Pr and P¯r be
the probability of choosing path r before and after removing edge a at
node i, respectively. We want to show under what conditions we have
P¯r − Pr < 0 for any path r ∈ Rci .
Note that P¯r can be written as:
P¯r =
e−Cr∑
l∈Ria e
−Cl−∆i +
∑
k∈Rci e
−Ck ∀r ∈ R
c
i
Dividing the numerator and denominator by
∑
l∈R e
−Cl , we find that:
P¯r =
Pr∑
l∈Ria Ple
−∆i +
∑
k∈Rci Pk
∀r ∈ Rci
From the previous expression, it follows that P¯r − Pr can be expressed
as:
P¯r − Pr = Pr
(
1∑
l∈Ria Ple
−∆i +
∑
k∈Rci Pk
− 1
)
Since Pr > 0, it follows that P¯r − Pr is negative iff(
1∑
l∈Ria Ple
−∆i +
∑
k∈Rci Pk
− 1
)
< 0.
Rearranging this expression, we get
1−
∑
k∈Rci
Pk <
∑
l∈Ria
Ple−∆i .
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Using the fact that P(Ri) =
∑
l∈Ri Pl = 1−
∑
k∈Rci Pk, we get
P(Ri)
P(Ria) < e
−∆i .
Noting that e−∆i = elog(|A
+
i |/|A+i −1|)κi =
(
|A+i |
|A+i |−1
)κi
, then we conclude:
κi >
log
(
P(Ri)
P(Ria)
)
log
(
|A+i |
|A+i |−1
) .

Some remarks are in order. First, Proposition 1 provides a simple
condition to know when removing an edge at node i can decrease the
probability of paths not crossing node i. Condition (17) captures the
fact that removing an edge at node i will not only modify the set of
available paths but also the choise aversion cost. Concretely, condition
(17) establishes a lower bound on the parameter κi in terms of the path
choice probabilities P(Ri) and P(Ria) and the magnitude of |A+i | and
|A+i −1|. To the best of our knowledge this result is new to the literature
on recursive discrete choice models in transportation networks.
Second, we note from a practical point of view that in order to test
whether condition (17) is satisfied or not, we only need the informa-
tion contained in the original network. For instance, we can use the
information contained in the estimation of the probabilities Pr for each
r ∈ Ri (before removing edge a) to understand how users react to
changes on the topology.
Third, Proposition 1 predicts that removing edge a ∈ A+i can de-
crease the probability of paths passing through nodes different from i.
We have identified this phenomenon as a failure of regularity in the
sense of Luce and Suppes (1965). However, behind this result is the
factor that reducing the cardinality of A+i reduces the cost associated
to choice aversion. This cost reduction can overweight the impact of
reducing the number of paths available. In the context of rational inat-
tention, Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) have shown that regularity may
fail in the logit model. Our result is different in two aspects. First,
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we study a recursive logit model with choice aversion in the context
of transportation networks. Second, our result highlights the role of
choice aversion by providing a specific condition on κi. Mateˇjka and
McKay (2015) use the idea of information acquisition in order to derive
their result.10
Finally, we mention that a particular case of Proposition 1 is when
κi = κ for all i ∈ A.
In order to see how Proposition 1 applies in the concrete case of
the network in Figure 6, Table 3 summarizes the information after
removing edges a1, a2, b1, and b2, respectively. The main message from
this table is the simplicity in checking Proposition 1.
Edge Removed Condition
a1 κ > 2.699
a2 κ > 0.692
b1 κ > 0.508
b2 κ > 0.905
Table 3. Conditions for regularity failure in Figure 6.
5. Welfare Analysis and Braess’s Paradox
In previous sections we have shown how the recursive choice aversion
model corrects the problem of predicting routing behavior when there
are overlapping paths. Similarly, we have shown how this model may
generate violations of regularity when some edge at the network is
removed.
In this section, we show how choice aversion can capture changes
to users welfare when the network topology is modified. Formally,
we make two contributions. First, we show that, under the presence of
choice aversion, adding edges to the network can decrease users’ welfare.
10We note that Mateˇjka and McKay (2015)’s analysis has been extended to the
general class of additive random utility models by Fosgerau et al..
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In particular, we show how a type of Braess’s paradox (Braess (1968)
and Braess et al. (2005)) can emerge even in the case of uncongested
networks. Second, we compare our approach with the APSL model in
terms of its ability to capture changes on welfare.
5.1. Welfare. Following McFadden (1981, Ch. 5), we define the users’
welfare as follows:
(18) C(κ) , E
(
min
r∈R
{Cr + r}
)
= − log
(∑
r∈R
e−Cr
)
,
where the last equality follows from Assumption 1. Notice that this
definition exploits the equivalence in Eq. (11) and makes explicit the
dependence of user welfare on the choice aversion parameter κ.
Following the literature on discrete choice models, expression (18)
can be interpreted as the inclusive value of paths in R, which is equiv-
alent to say that C(κ) measures the inclusive value of the source node s.
In particular, C(κ) represents the expected cost faced by the network
users.
It is easy to show that C(κ) is decreasing on κ. Similarly, it can be
shown that C(κ) is increasing on ca for a ∈ A. In particular, Lorca and
Melo (2020, Prop. 4) show that dC(κ)
dca
= xiP(a|A+i ).
The goal of this section is to use C(κ) to quantify changes on welfare
in response to adding or deleting edges to the network G. To that
end, we now connect κ with changes on C(κ) when the network G is
modified. Formally, we have the following:
Proposition 2. Fix a node i 6= s, t. Suppose that a new link a′ is added
to node i. Then C(κ) decreases if and only the following condition holds:
(19) κ <
log(1− P(a′|A+i ∪ {a′}))
log
(
|A+i |
|A+i +1|
) .
The previous result is a restatement of Lorca and Melo (2020, Thm.
1). Its relevance comes from the fact that we have a clear way to
understand how adding an edge to the network is welfare-improving as
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a function of the value of κ. In particular, for a given network, Eq.
(19) can be easily checked.
Subsequently, the choice aversion model predicts that there exists a
range of values for κ where the addition of costless edges can lead to a
decrease in welfare, even if the cost of newly created routes is lower than
existing routes. Thus, Braess’s Paradox-like phenomena may emerge
even in the case of uncongested transportation networks.
From an empirical point of view, Eq. (19) can be estimated providing
a simple test to understand when modifications to the network are
welfare improving or not.
5.1.1. Welfare and PSL models. In addition to being able to compute
changes on welfare using the choice aversion model, we also compute
changes in welfare using several PSL models. In particular, for this
class of models the welfare is defined as follows:
(20) Cˆ(θ) , E
(
min
r∈R
{Cˆr + r}
)
= − log
(∑
r∈R
e−Cˆr
)
,
where θ is a parameter vector describing the specific PSL model and Cˆr
represents the adjusted cost after applying the respective correction.
It is worth pointing out that the PSL models are not designed to
capture changes on welfare. So, Eq. (20) should be interpreted as an
adapted welfare measure. The reason to consider these measures is to
compare how traditional PSL models might be used to compute welfare
changes with the choice aversion model.
5.2. Braess’s Paradox. Traditionally, Braess’s paradox is studied as
the result of a congestion game in a transportation network. In this
context, Braess’s paradox predicts that introducing additional edges
with zero cost can actually contribute to a greater total network cost,
and, therefore, a decrease in welfare, than without the additional edges.
This counterintuitive result relies in the fact that users in the trans-
portation network are selfish (Roughgarden (2016)). As a consequence,
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i1
s t
i2
a1 a2
a3 a4
(A) Two unconnected paths
i1
s t
i2
a1 a2
a3 a4
a5
(B) Both paths connected by a5
Figure 7. Braess’s paradox ensuing from choice aver-
sion.
adding edges to the network can make everybody worse off in the sys-
tem.
However, the choice aversion model reveals that welfare decreases
can arise naturally even when networks are uncongested through in-
creasing choice set cardinality.11 To see this more explicitly, consider
the parameterization of Figure 7(A) where ca1 = ca4 = x with x ∈ [0, 3]
and ca2 = ca3 = 1. This figure depicts the case of a simple parallel se-
rial link network where the set of paths is given by RA = {r1, r2} with
r1 = (a1, a2) and r2 = (a3, a4).
Figure 7(B) shows the network with edge a5 added to the directed
acyclical graph, connecting i1 to i2. For the purpose of observing
Braess’s Paradox, we set ca5 = 0. The set of paths is given by RB =
RA ∪ {r3}, where r3 = (a1, a5, a4). We calculate the welfare according
to (18) for 7(A) and 7(B) and compare the difference.
According to Proposition 2, we can compute the threshold for κ that
determines when adding links is welfare improving. In particular, we
11Note that in the case of uncongested networks, users do not get involve in
strategic interaction.
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have that adding a link is welfare-improving when
κ <
log (1− e−x/(e−1 + e−x))
log(1/2)
.
After some algebra, we can express a relationship between κ and x as
follows:
(21) κ < − log
(
ex−1
ex−1 + 1
)
/ log 2.
From (21) it is easy to see that when x = 0 adding an edge is welfare
improving when κ < 1.89, approximately. Similarly, when x = 1, the
welfare increases when κ < 1. In particular, Eq. (21) shows that there
is an inverse relationship between κ and x.
Based on this observation, we show how C(κ) changes when x varies
for a constant κ. Figure 8 shows the welfare change for the choice
aversion model with κ = {1, 2} as well as the MNL model and other
PSL models and extensions mentioned in Section 4.
The choice aversion model where κ = 1 matches this characteriza-
tion, reflecting a welfare upgrade for x < 1 and a welfare downgrade
when x > 1.
Figure 8. Welfare change from network Figure 7(A) to
7(B) for various logit models.
29
In contrast, the MNL model only reflects a nonnegative change in
welfare from adding edge a5, a symptom of a model where additional
gains in welfare are realized from any additional route added to the
choice set of the agent. From a theoretical standpoint, this feature of
the MNL model captures the preference for flexibility in users’ prefer-
ences (Kreps (1979)).
Interestingly, most PSL models and extensions shown in Figure 5
reflect a welfare change similar to each other: a initial welfare gain
which decreases in x, ultimately leading to a decrease in welfare.
However, Duncan et al. (2020)’s Adaptive PSL model breaks from
the welfare change pattern observed by other models. For this model,
the difference in welfare is positive and decreasing until x = 1, but for
x > 1, the change in welfare is zero. This is a compelling result which
speaks to the strengths of this PSL extension.12
As pointed out before, an important property of the choice aversion
model is its microfoundation based in the behavioral concept of choice
overload, which provides justification for the penalization term in the
cost function as well as the observed outcomes. While there is a similar
welfare difference observed among the choice aversion model with κ = 1
and other PSL models and extensions, this microfoundation sets the
choice aversion model apart from other models.
It is important to note the contrast in welfare change between κ = 1
and κ = 2 for the choice aversion model. For κ = 2, Figure 8 clearly
12To understand why the APSL differs from traditional PSL models, we note
that cr3 ≤ cr1 = cr2 when x ≤ 1, with the equality holding only for x = 1. Here,
it is reasonable that we would observe an increase in welfare when a5 is added to
the network: for an uncongested network, we are adding a cheaper route choice
for users, and it is intuitive that this would improve welfare. Indeed, this result
is consistent with most models as shown in Figure 8. However, for x > 1, where
cr3 > cr1 = cr2 , the APSL model reflects no decrease in welfare. Again, this
is intuitive: when x > 1, adding costless edge a5 does not provide users with a
cheaper route choice. Since the users would incur cheaper costs from choosing
routes r1 or r2, the APSL model considers r3 to be an irrelevant addition to the
choice set and thus would not contribute to, nor detract from, welfare.
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shows that there is no value of x > 0 such that a positive welfare
change will be observed. Again, the decrease in welfare stems from a
dominating effect on route cost by the choice aversion term, amplified
by the choice aversion parameter κ. This contrast is important and
draws our attention to how welfare changes as κ varies for a fixed x.
(A) Choice aversion model (B) Adaptive PSL model
Figure 9. Welfare change as κ (β) varies.
Figure 9(A) shows how the difference in welfare calculated by the
choice aversion model responds to an increase in κ from 0 to 10 for fixed
x = {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3}. For each value of x displayed, we first see
a positive difference in welfare for low values of κ. As κ increases, the
difference in welfare continues to decrease until the welfare change is
negative. In other words, we see that the threshold κ (i.e., the κ where
the welfare change from adding edge a5 is no longer positive) decreases
in x. This occurrence stems from the fact that for low values of κ, the
instantaneous cost of each route dominates the choice aversion term in
the users’ cost functions. Thus, for low values of x, the welfare change is
initially positive, but as κ increases, the choice aversion term is updated
with increasing weight until the user’s aversion to choice dominates any
reduction in cost incurred by an additional route created by a5.
While the choice aversion model predicts this welfare decrease as a
result of its behavioral motivation, other logit models may not provide
the same outcome. For example, the APSL model does not show a
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welfare decrease for any value of x as shown by Figure 9(B). Rather,
this model seems to predict that the welfare change is nonnegative for
all values of β ∈ [0, 10] and only positive for β < 1.13 While this may
be sensible for x > 1, we would expect that a model looking to explain
decision-making behavior accurately would display a continuous trade-
off between route costs and aversion to increasing choice set cardinality.
However, we see that the threshold β, where the welfare change is no
longer positive, is approximately 1 for all values of x featured and most
notably for x < 1. The APSL model does not seem to be capable of
taking into account the tradeoff mentioned above, perhaps as a result
of its corrective nature and intentional design. While the APSL model
and other PSL models may have a strength in producing more intuitive
route choice probabilities, there appears to be a weakness in predicting
reasonable welfare changes from a behavioral point of view.
To summarize, while PSL models and extensions are developed to
correct the outcome of a standard logit model and provide what may
be deemed as more reasonable choice probabilities for a given network
topology, what they often lack is the behavioral foundation for any
penalties or adjustments in the cost function of the network user, which
would justify the outcomes they provide. Their designs also limit their
capability to model changes in welfare with respect to internal param-
eters. This is not to say that the existing PSL models are inferior;
indeed, these models are powerful and useful in various applications
at providing reasonable predictions in network flow allocations.14 We
simply wish to speak to the strengths of the choice aversion model
in the context of applications in transportation networks where choice
overload is a factor in users’ decision-making, as well as encourage a
convergence of the PSL literature with choice aversion models in trans-
portation network applications.
13Despite the difference in behavioral motivation, κ in the choice aversion model
and β in most PSL models, including the APSL model, serve a similar purpose and
can be compared equivalently.
14For instance, Duncan et al. (2020) analyze an example similar to Figure 2.
Their conclusions, while being quantitatively different, agree with the predictions
made by the choice aversion model.
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5.3. Node-Specific Choice Aversion Parameter. We can also mod-
ify our welfare analysis by incorporating node-specific choice aversion
parameters as previously defined in §2 such that κja ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A+ja
and all ja 6= t.
Accordingly, we update users’ welfare according to Eq. (18) under
node-specific choice aversion parameters such that
(22) C(κ) = − log
(∑
r∈R
e−Cr
)
= − log
(∑
r∈R
e−cr−ρr
)
where κ = {κi}i∈N , and cr and ρr follow Eq. (12). With updated rules
for choice probability and welfare, we can examine how heterogeneous
choice aversion parameters may be used in practice.
In particular, the impact of changes on a specific κi on C(κ) can be
formalized as follows:
Proposition 3. Let Ri be the set of all paths passing through node
i. Similarly, let Rci be the set of all paths passing through nodes other
than i. Then:
i) C(κ) is increasing in κi. In particular,
dC(κ)
dκi
=
∑
r∈Ri
Pr log |A+i | > 0.
ii) Fix a node i 6= s, t and suppose that a new edge a′ is added to
node i. Then C(κ) decreases if and only the following condition
holds:
(23) κi <
log(1− P(a′|A+i ∪ {a′}))
log
(
|A+i |
|A+i +1|
) ∀i 6= s, t.
Proof. i) Using the definitions of Ri and Rci , C(κ) can be written as:
C(κ) = − log
∑
r∈Ri
e−cr−ρr +
∑
r′∈Rci
e−cr′−ρr′

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Then taking the differential, we find:
dC(κ)
dκi
=
1∑
r∈R e
−cr−ρr
(∑
r∈Ri
e−cr−ρr
)
log |A+i |.
Noting that 1∑
r∈R e−cr−ρr
(∑
r∈Ri e
−cr−ρr) = ∑r∈Ri Pr, we conclude that
dC(κ)
dκi
=
∑
r∈Ri
Pr log |A+i | > 0.
ii) Follows the same argument used in proving Proposition 2. 
For an example of application, we borrow the complex network ex-
ample from Figure 4 and initialize κi = 1 for all i ∈ N . To see how
node-specific choice aversion parameterization can change outcomes to
path choice probability and welfare, we let κ2 and κ3 (that is, each
respective choice aversion parameter κi for node i ∈ {2, 3}) vary from
0 to 5 independently. Figure 10 displays the responses to choice prob-
abilities and welfare.
(A) Choice Probabilities as κ2 varies. (B) Welfare as κ2 varies.
(C) Choice Probabilities as κ3 varies. (D) Welfare as κ3 varies.
Figure 10. Choice probability and welfare responses
as κ2/κ3 varies across nodes for Figure 4 (example from
Fosgerau et al. (2013)).
In this example, a user will reach node 2 when taking r1, r2, or
r3. However, node 3, the only remaining node in this example with a
34
choice set cardinality greater than 1, is reached only by taking routes
r1 or r2. When κ2 is small and κ3 = 1, Figure 10(A) illustrates that
Pr1 = Pr2 < Pr3 ≤ Pr4 , with the equality holding at κ2 = 0. As κ2
increases, Pr3 declines further away from Pr4 and converges to Pr1 and
Pr2 as the common κ2 parameter dominates the cost functions of the
three routes.
Conversely, when κ2 = 1 and κ3 is small, shown in Figure 10(C), the
path choice probabilities for r1, r2, and r3 are close in value, but as κ3
increases, Pr3 increases until Pr1 and Pr2 are sufficiently close to zero.
However, Pr3 < Pr4 for all κ3 ∈ [0, 5] since the user is averse to the
choice set at node 2 with a fixed κ2 = 1.
Figures 10(B) and 10(D) show the changes to welfare as κ2 and κ3
increase from 0 to 5, respectively. There is a marked difference in the
level of welfare variation as κ2 increases and as κ3 increases. Because
node 2 is included in all routes in the network except for r4, an increase
or a decrease in κ2 has a larger effect on welfare than a change to κ3,
which is only accounted for along routes r1 and r2.
Heterogeneous specification of choice aversion at different nodes pro-
vides a more precise way of modeling and predicting changes to user
welfare. While some transportation contexts might warrant similar
degrees of choice aversion across nodes, we anticipate that other appli-
cations will benefit from the use of node-specific parameterization and
the more nuanced welfare predictions that follow.
6. Final Remarks
The recursive choice model with choice aversion is a highly tractable
extension of the standard MNL that can be used to predict reason-
able route choice probabilities and provide welfare interpretations in
transportation networks. Upon testing our approach against existing
PSL models, our model exhibits the power to provide reasonable cor-
rections and predictions with the benefit of a microfoundation in choice
overload.
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In addition, we explore how the choice aversion model allows for
a break in the regularity condition typically preserved by path choice
probabilities in logit models and extensions. In doing so, we show that,
conditional on the degree of choice aversion, removing edges in the
network can lead to a decrease in choice probability of certain existing
paths.
We also simulate the welfare implications of the choice aversion
model and find a novel prediction: even in uncongested networks, a
decrease in welfare akin to Braess’s Paradox can arise when costless
edges are added. Here, we also provide a simple characterization for
welfare changes conditional on choice aversion which is testable in em-
pirical settings.
It is worth remarking that given its simplicity, our model can be es-
timated following the methodology proposed by Fosgerau et al. (2013).
Exploiting these techniques allows one to test the hypothesis κi = κ
for all nodes i 6= t.
An important extension of this work is to consider the role of choice
aversion in the context of congested traffic networks and the respective
modeling approach. One way to study this question is to extend the
model in Baillon and Cominetti (2008) by introducing choice aversion
in their recursive approach.
Finally, we remark that there is much work to be done regarding the
empirical support of choice aversion in transportation networks. Fu-
ture work regarding experiments on behavior of participants in trans-
portation networks would help establish a better understanding of the
significance of choice overload in making routing choices.
Appendix A. Path size logit models
PSL models include correction terms to penalize routes that share
links with other routes, so that the deterministic cost of route r ∈ R is
Cr = cr + µr, where µr ≥ 0 is a correction term for route r ∈ R. The
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probability that a user chooses path r is given by:
(24) Pˆr =
e−cr+µr∑
r′∈R e
−cr′+µr′
∀r ∈ R
Following Ben-Akiva and Bierlarie (1999), Path Size Logit (PSL) mod-
els adopt the form µi = β ln (γr) , where β ≥ 0 is the path size scaling
parameter, and γr ∈ (0, 1] is the path size term for route r ∈ R.
A distinct route with no shared links has a path size term equal to
1, resulting in no penalization. Less distinct routes have smaller path
size terms and incur greater penalization. The probability that a user
chooses route r ∈ R is:
Pˆr =
e−cr+β ln(γr)∑
r′∈R e
−cr′+β ln(γr′ )
=
(γr)
β e−θcr∑
r′∈R (γr′)
β e−θcr′
=
1∑
r′∈R
(
γr′
γr
)β
e−θ(cr′−cr)
The Path Size Logit (PSL) model was first proposed by Ben-Akiva
and Ramming, and states that the PSL path size term for route r ∈
R, γPSr , is defined as follows:
(25) γPSr =
∑
a∈r
ca
cr
1∑
r∈R δar′
where δar′ = 1 if edge a belongs to path r
′ and δar′ = 0 otherwise.
In Eq. (25) each link a in route r is penalized (in terms of decreasing
the path size term and increasing the cost of the path) according to the
number of paths in the choice set that also use that link
(∑
r′∈R δar′
)
,
and the significance of the penalization is weighted according to how
prominent edge a is in route r, i.e. the cost of edge a in relation to the
total cost of path r,
(
ca
cr
)
.
A.1. Generalized Path Size Logit (GPSL). Ben-Akiva and Bier-
larie (1999) formulate an alternative PSL model (PSL’) that attempts
to reduce the contributions of excessively expensive routes to the path
size terms of more realistic routes in the choice set. The GPSL model
states that the PSL path size term for route r ∈ R, γPSL′r , is defined as
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follows:
(26) γPSL
′
r =
∑
a∈r
ca
cr
1∑
r′∈R
(
min(cr′′ :r′′∈R)
cr′
)
δar′
where δar′ = 1 if edge is in path r
′ and δar′ = 0 otherwise.
In Eq. (26) the contribution of route r to path size terms is weighted
according to the ratio of route r and the cheapest route in the choice
set
(
min(cr′′ :r′′∈R)
cr
)
, and hence contributions of high costing routes com-
pared to the cheapest alternative are reduced.
As Ramming describes, however, when a route is completely distinct
its path size term is not always equal to 1 which results in an undesired
penalization upon the utility of that route. To combat this, Ramming
proposes the Generalized Path Size Logit (GPSL) model. The GPSL
model states that the GPSL path size term for route r ∈ R, γGPSLr , is
defined as follows:
(27) γGPSLr =
∑
a∈r
ca
cr
1∑
r′∈R
(
cr
cr′
)λ
δar′
where δar′ = 1 if edge a is in path r
′ and δar′ = 0 otherwise and
λ ≥ 0. It is easy to see that the GPSL model is equivalent to the PSL
model when λ = 0. In Eq. (27) the contribution of route r′ to the
path size term of route r (the path size contribution factor) is weighted
according to the cost ratio between the routes,
((
cr
cr′
)λ)
, and hence
the contributions of high costing routes to the path size terms of low
costing routes is reduced. λ ≥ 0 is the path size contribution scaling
parameter to be estimated.
A.2. Adaptive Path Size Logit Model (APSL). In an attempt to
improve on existing PSL models and extensions, Duncan et al. (2020)
propose an internally consistent PSL model where all components as-
sess the feasibility of routes according to its relative attractiveness due
to travel cost and distinctiveness. Formally, their correction can be
defined as follows:
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Definition 1. The APSL choice probabilities, P∗, ( for a choice set of size R)
are a solution to the fixed-point problem P∗ = G
(
g
(
γAPSL(P∗)
))
where:
Gr
(
gr
(
γAPSL(P∗)
))
= τ + (1−Nτ) · gr
(
γAPSL(P∗)
)
(28)
gr
(
γAPSL(P∗)
)
=
(
γAPSLr (P∗)
)β
e−θcr∑
r′∈R (γ
APSL
r′ (P∗))
β
e−θcr′
(29)
γAPSLr (P∗) =
∑
a∈r
ca
cr
1∑
r′∈R
(
Pr′
Pr
)
δar′
(30)
∀r ∈ R, ∀P∗ ∈ D(τ), θ > 0, β ≥ 0, 0 < τ ≤ 1R
D(τ) =
{
P∗ ∈ RR++ : τ ≤ P∗r ≤ (1− (R− 1)τ), ∀r ∈ R,
∑
r′∈R Pr′ = 1
}
Despite the fact that there is no closed-form representation of the
choice probabilities for the APSL model, the APSL model corrects for
many of the internal consistency issues in route cost and distinctiveness
that trouble other PSL models, which makes its recent introduction in
the literature particularly useful in working to predict route choice
probabilities more appropriately.
References
Baillon, J. B. and Cominetti, R. (2008). Markovian traffic equilibrium.
Math Program. Ser. B, 111:33–56.
Ben-Akiva, M. and Bierlarie, M. (1999). Discrete choice methods and
their applications to short term travel decisions. Handbook of trans-
portation Science, pages 5–34.
Ben-Akiva, M. and Lerman, S. (1985). Discrete Choice Analysis: The-
ory and Application to Travel Demand. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1
edition.
Ben-Akiva, M. and Ramming, M. S. Lecture notes: discrete choice
models of traveler behavior in networks. Prepared for Advanced Meth-
ods for Planning and Management of Transportation Networks .
Braess, D. (1968). Uber ein paradoxon aus der verkehrsplanung. Un-
ternehmensforschung, 12(1):258–268.
39
Braess, D., Nagurney, A., and Wakolbinger, T. (2005). On a paradox
of traffic planning. Transportation Science, 39(4):446–450.
Duncan, L. C., Watling, D. P., Connors, R. D., Rasmussen, T. K., and
Nielsen, O. A. (2020). Path size logit route choice models: Issues with
current models, a new internally consistent approach, and parameter
estimation on a large-scale network with gps data. Transportation
Research Part B: Methodological, 135:1 – 40.
Fosgerau, M., Frejinger, E., and Karlstrom, A. (2013). A link based
network route choice model with unrestricted choice set. Transporta-
tion Research Part B: Methodological, 56:70–80.
Fosgerau, M. and Jiang, G. (2019). Travel time variability and rational
inattention. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 120:1
– 14.
Fosgerau, M., Melo, E., de Palma, A., and Shum, M. Discrete choice
and rational inattention: A general equivalence result. International
Economic Review, n/a(n/a).
Frejinger, E. and Bierlarie, M. (2007). Capturing correlation with sub-
networks in route choice models. Transportation Research Part B,
pages 363–378.
Fudenberg, D. and Strzalecki, T. (2015). Dynamic logit with choice
aversion. Econometrica, 83(2):651–691.
Jiang, G., Fosgerau, M., and Lo, H. K. (2020). Route choice, travel time
variability, and rational inattention. Transportation Research Part
B: Methodological, 132:188 – 207. 23rd International Symposium on
Transportation and Traffic Theory (ISTTT 23).
Kreps, D. (1979). A representation theorem for “preference for flexi-
bility”. Econometrica, 47(3):565–577.
Lorca, J. and Melo, E. (2020). Choice aversion in directed networks.
Working Papers.
Luce, D. R. and Suppes, P. (1965). Preference, utility, and subjective
probability. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1 edition.
Mai, T., Fosgerau, M., and Frejinger, E. (2015). A nested recursive
logit model for route choice analysis. Transportation Research Part
B: Methodological, 75:100 – 112.
40
Mateˇjka, F. and McKay, A. (2015). Rational inattention to discrete
choices: A new foundation for the multinomial logit model. American
Economic Review, 105(1):272–98.
McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice
behavior. Frontiers in Econometrics, pages 105–142.
McFadden, D. (1978). Behavioural travel modelling, chapter 13: Quan-
titive methods for analyzing travel behaviour of individuals: some
recent developments, pages 279–318. Croom Helm London.
McFadden, D. (1981). Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econo-
metric Applications, chapter Econometric Models of Probabilistic
Choice, pages 198–272. Cambridge: MIT.
Ortoleva, P. (2013). The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of think-
ing aversion. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(3):903 – 934.
Ramming, M. S. Network knowledge and route choice. Ph.D. Thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Roughgarden, T. (2016). Twenty Lectures in Algorithmic Game The-
ory. Cambridge University Press, 1 edition.
Scheibehenne, B., Greifeneder, R., and Todd, P. M. (2010). Can There
Ever Be Too Many Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice
Overload. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(3):409–425.
Sheena, I. and Lepper, M. R. (2000). When choice is demotivating:
can one desire too much of a good thing ? Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 79(6):995–1006.
Train, K. (2009). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge
University Press, second edition.
Zimmermann, M. and Frejinger, E. (2020). A tutorial on recursive
models for analyzing and predicting path choice behavior. EURO
Journal on Transportation and Logistics, 9(2):100004.
